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Catalano: Balancing National Security Interests against the Value of Chines

NOTE
BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
AGAINST THE VALUE OF CHINESE CAPITAL
I. INTRODUCTION

In August of 2017, the Chinese Commerce Ministry issued a

statement expressing "strong dissatisfaction with the U.S. approach to
unilateralism and protectionism."' The statement came in response to an
investigation launched by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer
into the question of whether China was unfairly obtaining American
technology and intellectual property. 2 China has often been accused of
hacking, spying, and forcing companies to share commercial
information, which has led to tremendous scrutiny of its economic and

trade practices in the United States.3 Consistent with this policy
direction, within a month of launching the investigation, the Trump
administration had blocked the acquisition of an American technology

company, Lattice Semiconductors.' The administration objected to the
acquisition on the grounds that Canyon Bridge, the private equity
firm set to acquire Lattice, was backed by a Chinese state-owned
asset manager.'
1. Jethro Mullen & Serena Dong, China Blasts U.S. 'Protectionism' After Trump Triggers
Trade Probe, CNN MONEY (Aug. 21, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/21/
news/economy/china-us-trump-trade-probe/index.html?iid=EL.
2. Id.
3. Id; see also Jethro Mullen, How China Squeezes Tech Secrets From U.S. Companies,
CNN MONEY (Aug. 14, 2017, 11:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/14/news/economy/trumpchina-trade-intellectual-property/index.html?iid=EL. Chinese law requires that foreign firms that
want to engage in economic activities within certain sectors in China, such as the energy,
telecommunications, and automotive industries, must enter into joint ventures with local partners.
Mullen, supra. These joint ventures mean the transfer of software code and product designs to
foreign firms' Chinese partners. Id.
4. Trump Blocks Chinese Purchase of Lattice Semiconductor, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 14, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/trump-blocks-chinese-purchase-lattice-semiconductor170914045430005.html.
5. Id.; see also Trump Blocks Chinese-Backed Lattice Bid, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Sept. 13,
2017, 8:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-13/trump-blocks-chinabacked-bid-for-chipmaker-over-security-risk.
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The fear of government intervention through the use of state-owned
enterprises is far from imaginary.6 In early 2014, the Ukrainian
government, then engaged in armed conflict with rebels in eastern
Ukraine, faced a new twist in the conflict: Gazprom, the massive
Russian state-owned energy corporation, threatened to cut off its natural
gas supplies to the country.7 Gazprom justified its price hike and threats
to cease service altogether with references to Ukraine's failure to pay,
but Ukrainian officials painted a different picture, one of politicallymotivated retaliation intended to destabilize the country and further the
political goals of the pro-Russian rebels.8 Specifically, Ukrainian Prime
Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk stated that Ukraine would not pay higher
prices for the Russian gas to see that money channeled into arms for the
rebels.9 The role that Gazprom played in the conflict between Russia and
Ukraine is informative and serves as a real example of the potential
threat that foreign state-owned enterprises pose in the increasingly
interwoven geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century.' 0
Large Chinese investments and acquisitions in the United States
and Europe are a fairly recent phenomenon, beginning with Lenovo's
acquisition of IBM's personal computer division for 1 and 1.75 billion
dollars in 2005.11 They continued, and in April 2017, media sources
reported that ChemChina had acquired Swiss pesticide and seed supplier
Syngenta at a price of forty-three billion dollars, marking the largest
cross-border acquisition of a Western corporation by a Chinese
corporation in history. 2 While cross-border investment is hardly a direct
problem, Chinese investment in Western corporations has a different
flavor which makes these developments troubling. Namely, ChemChina
is a state-owned enterprise ("SOE"), 3 as are many of China's largest
corporations, 1 4 and the implications of an investment wave with such
6. See Michael Bimbaum, Russia Threatens Embattled Ukraine With Cutoff of Gas, WASH.
POST, June 1, 2014, at A16.

7.

Id.

8. See Michael Bimbaum & Carol Morello, Moscow Halts Natural Gas to Ukraine, WASH.
POST, July 17, 2014, at A9.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Sumner Lemon, Lenovo Completes Purchaseof IBM's PC Unit, PCWORLD (May 2,
2005, 7:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/120670/article.html.
12.

See Alanna Petroff, China Gets Green Light for Biggest-EverForeign Acquisition, CNN

MONEY (Apr. 5, 2017, 8:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/05/investing/syngenta-chemchinatakeover-acquisition/index.html.
13. See About Us, CHEMCHINA, http://www.chemchina.com/en/gywm/A6016web l.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2018).
14. See Tanisha A. James & M. Howard Morse, Regulatory Hurdles Facing Mergers with
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in the United States and the European Union, 1 CHINA
ANTITRUST L.J., 1, 5 (2017).
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deeply rooted political undertones is worthy of scrutiny. 5 SOEs are
often established by governments to achieve political ends in addition to
the desires of traditional corporations, such as profit maximization.
Scholars fear that the Chinese government may have political
motivations in encouraging its SOEs to invest internationally.16
The commonly touted fears surrounding this influx of Chinese
capital into Western economies concern the inaccessibility of Chinese
markets, risks to national security, and the threat of Chinese
surveillance. 7 Chinese regulatory provisions have made it difficult for
Western corporations to invest in the country.1 8 For example, the
Chinese government's approach to protecting intellectual property rights
has been cited as a primary reason that Western corporations fmd the
Chinese market to be an unattractive investment target. 19 The risks to
national security of SOE investments in United States corporations are
often brought up in the nation's highest forum, Congress itself, which
places such transactions under severe scrutiny.2" In 2005, Congress took
15. See Alan Riley, Dealing with the Chinese Investment Wave: Overhauling the Western
Response, INST. FOR STATECRAFT (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.statecraft.org.uk/research/dealingchinese-investment-wave-overhauling-westem-response-0 (discussing the potential national security
threats involved with Chinese investment in the U.S. economy).
16. See James & Morse, supra note 14, at 3-4 (discussing the various reasons governments
have for establishing SOEs); see also Jennifer M. Harris, Chinese Investment in the United States:
Timefor New Rules?, LAWFARE (Apr. 11, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chineseinvestment-united-states-time-new-rules (discussing the alignment of recent Chinese SOE
acquisitions with the Chinese government's five-year plan to increase investment into primary
resources and technology and the fears that Chinese SOEs will outcompete American corporations
in these sectors). China has a long history of utilizing its SOEs to achieve policy goals. In the postWorld War II era, the newly founded People's Republic of China created SOEs to rebuild the
country's economy and infrastructure. James & Morse, supra note 14, at 3-4. SOEs have dominated
the Chinese economy since, even after reforms aimed at loosening state control over the country's
largest businesses. Id.
17. See Riley, supra note 15.
18. See David Dollar, United States-China Two-way Direct Investment: Opportunitiesand
Challenges, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/uschina-two-way-direct-investment-dollar.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
19. Id
20. Timothy Webster, Why Does the United States Oppose Asian Investment?, 37 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 213, 233 (2017) (describing Congress's reaction to the proposed acquisition of U.S.
oil company Unocal by China National Offshore Oil Company ("CNOOC")). At the time of the
transaction, seventy percent of CNOOC's shares were owned by the Chinese state, with the
remaining thirty percent publicly traded on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. See id.
at 234. James Woolsey, at that time director of the CIA, described the proposed acquisition as
evidence of a "[Chinese] strategy of domination of energy markets and of the Western Pacific."
China National Offshore Oil-Unocal Merger: Hearing Before the Comm. on Armed Serv.
H.R., 109th Cong. 110-12 (2005). CNOOC abandoned the acquisition due to this opposition. Ben
White, Chinese Drop Bid to Buy US. Oil Firm, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080200404.html
(discussing CNOOC's eighteen and a half billion USD bid on Unocal and its subsequent
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issue with the potential acquisition of American oil company Unocal and
its pipelines in the Middle East by a Chinese SOE, China National
Offshore Oil Company ("CNOOC"), citing concerns that the deal would
forfeit American influence in the region at the height of the global war
on terror.2 '
Further concerns along the same lines involve the growing presence
of sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs") in the United States.22 Specifically,
China Investment Corporation ("CIC"), an eight hundred billion dollar
state-owned fund, was following Chinese investment of forty-six billion
dollars in the United States economy in 2016-three times the nation's
investment in the previous year. 23 Because SWFs are state owned and
are a directed investment of the government's money, they are
inherently political, and the financial decision-making of SWFs is
usually guided by the political objectives of the state.24 Similar to their
skepticism by the
SOE counterparts, SWFs have been greeted with
25
Western economies in which they choose to invest.
Meanwhile, shareholder activism, the leveraging of large minority
stakes to influence boards of directors to take action according to the
stakeholder's wishes, 26 is on the rise. 27 Nearly fifty percent of U.S.
boards of directors engaged with agitators or prepared for such
engagements in 2014.28 Shareholder activism, used primarily by fund
managers, has been tremendously successful, but the tactics employed
by activists can be used by any entity with the capital and motivation to

withdrawal).
21. See Webster, supra note 20, at 233.
22.

See Sui-Lee Wee, China'sInvestment Fund Seeks Greater US. Access, N.Y. TIMES, July

11, 2017, at B2.
23.

See id.

24.

See id.

25.

See SANDRO GRUNENFELDER, UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING POLITICAL RISKS OF

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 80-88 (2013). Concerns over international investments by SWFs
predate the popularization of the term "sovereign wealth fund." Id. at 81. During the 1980s, the
United States canceled a contract between a FIAT affiliate and the United States' Defense
Department on the grounds that FIAT was partially owned by a Libyan SWF. Id. at 80. Margaret
Thatcher objected to the Kuwaiti Investment Authority's 21.7% stake in British Petroleum, fearing
that such a large share in the British corporation could be leveraged to further Kuwaiti political
interests. Id.
26. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. Cop. L. 51, 60-62 (2011) (describing techniques and tactics used

by hedge funds). "The hedge funds in question held, on average, 9.8% of the shares of the
companies they targeted." Id. at 60.
27.

See Mary Ann Cloyd, ShareholderActivism Who, What, When, and How?, HARV. L. SCH.

F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG., (Apr. 7, 2015) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/
04/07/shareholder-activism-who-what-when-and-how.
28. See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss1/18

4

Catalano: Balancing National Security Interests against the Value of Chines

BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITYINTERESTS

2018]

do so. 9 To date, Chinese acquisitions of Western corporations have
largely been majority-control takeovers,3" but if the Chinese government
wishes to influence industry sectors in foreign countries through the use
of its SOEs, much smaller capital investments, coupled with aggressive
shareholder agitation, can be made to achieve those ends, especially if a
full-scale takeover is a looming threat.31
That said, Chinese capital is incredibly valuable to the United
States' industry sectors.3 2 China is one of the five largest exporters of
investment capital in the world, and over the past ten years the value of
Chinese capital in the United States has increased by a factor of over one
hundred.33 Statistics from 2014 place those investments at approximately
forty percent in the financial sector, seventeen percent in manufacturing,
twelve percent in real estate, and five percent in the energy supply and
production industry, with an additional nineteen percent spread across
real estate, wholesale and retail trade, and leasing and business
services. 4 These investments have tangible effects on the U.S. economy,
creating jobs with wages substantially higher than industry averages.35
Taken together, there is a real threat of foreign SOEs and SWFs
using shareholder activist tactics to advance politically motivated goals,
but the benefits of Chinese direct investment in the United States should
not be hand waved away in the face of national security interests.36 As
such, there is a need for a preemptive response that preserves the inflow
of capital into the United States while foreclosing any avenue for
abuse.37 While the United States has a great deal of regulatory
infrastructure aimed at preventing harmful foreign investment, such as
38
the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 ("FINSA")
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Petroff, supra note 12 (discussing ChemChina's acquisition of controlling stake
in Syngenta); Press Release, Google, Lenovo to Acquire Motorola Mobility from Google, LENOVO

(Jan. 29, 2014), http://news.lenovo.com/news-releases/lenovo-to-acquire-motorola-mobility-fromgoogle.htm (discussing Lenovo's acquisition of controlling stake in Motorola).
31. See MICHAEL BUKART & SAMUEL LEE, HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM VS. HOSTILE TAKEOVER
BIDS 21 (2015), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2585836.
32. Patrick Griffin, CFIUS in the Age of Chinese Investment, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1757,
1775-76 (2017).

33. Id. at 1776. Between 2005 and 2009, the United States received a combined average value
of less than one billion USD per year. Id. Between 2012 and 2016, the net total of Chinese
investment in the United States increased to just over one hundred billion USD. Id. at 1775-76.
34. Id. at 1776.
35.

Theodore H. Moran, Weighing Up China's Investment in the United States, PETERSON

INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/weighing-chinasinvestment-united-states.
36.
37.

See infra Part H.E.
See infra Part TV.

38. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49 (2007).
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and the Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States
("CFIUS"), 39 a section of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 ("HSR Act")' should be amended.4 1
The HSR Act requires parties to significant voting securities
transactions to submit notification to the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") and Department of Justice ("DOJ"), abide by a waiting period,
and receive approval of the transaction after review. 42 The HSR Act's
investment-only exemption ("Investment-Only Exemption") provides
that if an acquisition is "solely for the purpose of investment, ' 43 and if
the voting securities acquired represent less than ten percent of those
outstanding," then these regulatory hurdles may be avoided.4 5 Perhaps
not coincidentally, the average stake activist shareholders have in a
corporation is 9.8%,46 just under the Investment-Only Exemption's ten
percent threshold.47 This Note proposes a set of statutory amendments to
FINSA and the HSR Act, which would function together to allow for
judicial review of executive decisions blocking transactions, provide
clarity to prospective participants in such transactions, and incentivize
foreign investors to avail themselves of the dovetailed Investment-Only
Exemptions of FINSA and the HSR Act by purchasing sizeable minority
stakes as opposed to majority-control acquisitions.48
While the meaning of "solely for the purpose of investment" has
established unclear boundaries for shareholder activity and abuses of the
Investment-Only Exemption have grown in recent years, litigation has
shown that the exemption is well-policed.4 9 By expanding the threshold
of the Investment-Only Exemption, the United States will be able to
effectively incentivize greater investment of significant foreign capital in

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP'T
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/intemational/Pages/Committee-on-ForeignInvestment-in-US.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).
39.

TREASURY,

41.

See infra Part PV.C.

42. See James & Morse, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing a dataset of 784 instances between
1993 and 2006 where a hedge fund disclosed that it owed five percent or more of the shares of a
publicly traded company).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 18a(c).
46. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 26, at 60.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9).
48. See infra PartIV.
49. See Barry A. Nigro, ValueAct Settlement: A Record Fine for HSR Violations, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CoRP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 19, 2016), http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/
Publications/2016-07-19-valueact-settlement-a-record-fine-for-hsr-violation.pdf (last visited Nov.
10, 2018).
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U.S. companies in a manner that will not threaten the United States'
national security or political and economic integrity.5"
This Note defines state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth
funds, specifically discussing those of Chinese origin5 1 and assessing the
impact they have had on the American economy in Part 11.52 This Note
further assesses the existing legal framework surrounding the assessment
of cross-border investment on securities grounds53 and securities
regulation54 and the weaknesses inherent in the existing framework in
Part III 5 Finally, this Note will recommend legislative amendments to
the process of assessing cross-border investments in the United States on
national security grounds, as well as legislative amendments to existing
securities and antitrust provisions with the goal of enticing SOEs and
SWFs to take a passive, minority stake-oriented approach to investments
56
in the United States in Part IV.
II. THE COMPLEX WEB OF CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

The web of regulation surrounding investment in the United States,
specifically with respect to foreign investors, is complex.5 7 In Subpart A,
this Note examines SOEs, how they operate in general, and how Chinese
SOEs have made investment inroads in the United States. 8 In Subpart B,
this Note examines the so-called SWF, investment funds created by
states by pooling excess capital reserves and the cross-border
investments the Chinese Investment Corporation has made in the United
States.59 This Part then examines the aggregated effect of outbound
investment from China.6" Finally, this Part examines tactics used by
large minority shareholders to leverage control over corporations 61 and
how international investment and activist tactics are regulated, by
the framework of FINSA and a host of securities and antitrust
62
provisions, respectively.

50. See infra Part IV.
51. See infra Part ll.A-B.
52.

See infra Part I.

53. See infra Part lII.A.
54.

See infra Part lIB.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part ll.
infra Part IV.
infra Part ll.A-F.
infra Part H.A.
infra Part l.B.
infra Part ll.C.
infra Part ll.D.
infra Part ll.E-G.
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A. SOEs, in Generaland in China
SOEs are business entities owned by governments rather than
private actors and, much like any business, generate revenue by
providing goods or services. 63 However, SOEs differ from traditional,
privately-held businesses in a variety of ways.' They are often tasked
with promoting public-policy objectives, enjoy certain privileges and
immunities unavailable to private businesses, such as tax exemptions,
inexpensive financing, and tax and regulatory exemptions, and are
frequently shielded from takeover attempts. 6 They may be used to tap
into strategic resources, accelerate a nation's economic growth, promote
growth in emerging sectors with high initial investment costs, promote
protections, or create easily and efficiently
economic stability and
66
monopolies.
regulated
SOEs exist globally, including within the United States. 67 After the
collapse of the housing market and the onset of the recent financial
crisis, the U.S. government acquired sixty percent of General Motors's
stock in an effort to protect the industry leader from collapse and
remained a significant shareholder until selling the last of its stake in the
corporation in 2013.68 The United States government also owns and
operates Amtrak, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Postal
Service, and sponsors the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
and the Federal National Mortgage Association.69 Clearly, SOEs have
their place in the global economy, and their presence is keenly felt in
developing economies, where state-control over industry sectors can
greatly support their development.7" Of particular note is India, where
SOEs account for ten to twenty percent of the country's gross domestic
product ("GDP") employment, as well as Russia and China, where SOEs
account for approximately thirty percent.7 1
The People's Republic of China was established in 1949, and after
years of war and underdevelopment, the emergent state had limited

63. See James & Morse, supra note 14, at 2.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id at 2-3.
67. See id. at 3; Bill Vlasic & Annie Lowrey, US. Ends Bailout of G.M., Selling Last Shares
of Stock, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 2013, at BI.
68. See Vlasic & Lowrey supra note 67.
69. See James & Morse, supra note 14, at 3.
70. See id. at 2-3.
71. See The Role of State-Owned Enterprises, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/CA/PRIV(2008)9&
docLanguage=En (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
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infrastructure, capital, and industrial capability.7 2 The Chinese
government determined that rebuilding the country required a
centralized alignment of state and commerce and established a host of
SOEs that were entirely owned by the government and directed by state
planners and ministries.73 China has attempted to shift towards
privatization for decades, and since 1978, the overall share of industrial
production in China attributable to SOEs shifted from 77.6% (with
virtually all of the remainder allocated to collective-owned enterprises)
to approximately thirty percent in 2004.74 Even so, SOEs are still
massive players in the Chinese economy, accounting for seventeen
percent of urban employment, twenty-two percent of industrial income,
and thirty-eight percent of the country's industrial assets. 75 The top ten
valued companies on the Shanghai Composite Index are government
owned,76 and the three largest Chinese SOEs listed on the Fortune
Global 500 (of seventy-six) account for over $1.2 trillion in revenue.77
Further, and most relevant to this discussion, Chinese SOEs are by far
the biggest leader in foreign direct investment, and in 2006, at the outset
of the surge in Chinese acquisition of corporations and investment in
Western economies, accounted for eighty-one percent of China's
aggregate investment.78
B. The Sovereign Wealth Fund, in General and in China
However, SOEs are not the only source of outbound Chinese
capital.79 SWFs are monolithic investment funds founded and owned by
governments.8 ° Large capital inflows into emerging economies, like
China, come with the risk of inflation, which can be offset with the
issuance of domestic debt at another, separate price, that of "negative

72. James & Morse, supranote 14, at 4.
73. See id.
74. See The Role of State-Owned Enterprises,supra note 71.
75. See Enda Curran, State Companies: Back on China's To-Do List, BLOOMBERG
BUSiNESSWEEK, Aug. 2015, at 49, 50.
76. See Scott Cendrowski, Here's What You May Not Know About the Chinese Stock Market,
FORTUNE (Sept. 2, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/02/heres-what-you-may-not-know-about-thechinese-stock-market.
77. See Scott Cendrowski, China's Global 500 Companies Are Bigger Than Ever-and
Mostly State-Owned, FORTUNE (July 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/china-global-500government-owned. The ten largest Chinese companies on the Fortune 500, all state-owned, account
for over $2.1 trillion in revenue. Id.
78. See The Role of State-OwnedEnterprises,supra note 71.
79. See Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Jurisdiction Under the FSA, 11 U. PA.

J. Bus. L. 967, 975-76 (2009).
80.

See id. at 967.
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carry."81 Negative carry refers to the negative cost of holding an asset
when the interest payments on issued debt exceed the amount generated
by reserve holdings. 2 The losses emerging countries suffer due to
negative carry eat into budgets, taxes, and social programs; however,
SWFs are curative. 83 By channeling excess reserves from central banks
into funds, the state can proceed to invest these liquid assets and achieve
returns that balance and exceed the weight of the negative carry.
In China, the most visible SWF is the Chinese Investment
Corporation, which was established in 2007 to help China increase its
rate of return on its foreign exchange reserves.85 CIC was founded with
$200 billion in assets.8 6 Over the past ten years, that number has risen to
close to $815 billion, and in 2016, CIC posted continued increases in
profits based on international investment performances.8 7
Many are made uneasy by the prolific international investments of
SWFs.8 8 Within the United States, there are fears that such investment is
un-American, that public ownership is inefficient compared to private
ownership, and, perhaps most importantly, that the United States may
become subordinated to the policy interests of foreign states which have
made strategic investments in key American economic sectors. 89 While
proponents of free trade and open border approaches to foreign direct
investment will decry these fears as irrational or overstated, this fear of
foreign states exercising their investments to further geopolitical goals is
not unfounded. 9°
Gazprom, the third largest corporation in the world in 2008, is a
Russian SOE.9 1 Prior to the winter of 2008, Gazprom flexed its position
as the supplier of twenty-five percent of the European Union's natural
gas by ceasing delivery of energy supplies to Ukraine. 92 After the
81. See Brendan J. Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Barbariansat the Gate? An
Analysis of Legal and Business Implications of their Ascendancy, 4. VA. L. & BUS. REV. 97, 99
(2009).
82.

See id.

83.

Seeidat99-100.

84.
85.

See id. at 100.
See Matthew Miller, China Sovereign Fund CIC Profit Rises, Seeks More US. Direct

Investment, REUTERS (July 11, 2017, 2:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-cicresults/china-sovereign-fund-cic-profit-rises-seeks-more-u-s-direct-investment-idUSKBN 9W0HR.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Mark E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth Funds: Using the
Markets and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Together to Make the
United States More Secure, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 88, 89 (2008).

89.
90.
91.
92.

See id
See Reed, supra note 81, at 111-13.
Seeid. at 111.
See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss1/18

10

Catalano: Balancing National Security Interests against the Value of Chines

2018]

BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, Gazprom again shut down
its oil supplies to Ukraine in the middle of the winter of 2015 when
3
temperatures had dropped well below freezing. It is indicative that the
media's coverage of Gazprom's moves mirrors the way Ukraine treats
Russia and Gazprom as one and the same.94 It is further indicative that
the multiple instances of suspension of gas supplies have tracked
tensions between the two countries.9 5 Russia cut off its supplies (through
Gazprom) during the conflict between the Ukrainian government and the
pro-Russian rebels in 2014 and hiked prices immediately following the
96
removal of Ukraine's Kremlin-backed leader, Viktor Yanukovych.
This clearly hostile usage of economic leverage in foreign countries sets
the stage for the analysis of SWFs, which are arguably even more
politically entwined than their SOE counterparts due to the fact that they
exist to invest their state's capital.97
SWFs are distinguishable from their SOE counterparts, but fears
remain due to the lack of transparency with respect to their reported
holdings9 8 and for the fact that SWFs often do not look to maximize
profits, investing with bias instead. 99 SWFs are not required to disclose
their holdings-and the majority do not-leading skeptics to call for a
"voluntary code of conduct" to be universally accepted as best practice
in the SWF market.1"'
Furthermore, SWFs wield enormous power with which they can
10
In
affect economies and political relations between nation-states.
banks
Iceland's
that
conclusion
the
2007, a Norwegian SWF came to
bonds. 10 2
were overstretched and made the decision to short those banks'
While this made financial sense, the result was an international political
confrontation, as the prime minister of Iceland declared the move a
violation of a Nordic mutual-defense pact against economic
destabilization.10 3 As a result, the Norwegian SWF acquiesced and
93. See Associated Press, Russia's Gazprom Cuts off Gas Supplies to Ukraine, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 25, 2015, 4:13 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russias-gazprom-cuts-gassupplies-ukraine-n469351.
94. See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Cuts Gas; Europe Shivers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009,
at Al; Russia Halts Gas Supplies to Ukraine After Talks Breakdown, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33341322.
95. Russia Halts Gas Supplies to UkraineAfter Talks Breakdown, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. See Reed, supra note 81, at 100, 103.
98. See id at 106, 109.
99. See id. at 106-07.
at 106.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 105-06.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 105.
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purchased the Icelandic bonds, though the damage had, at some level,
already been done. 1 4 Like Gazprom and similarly structured SOEs,
SWFs are capable of making politically impactful moves, and their
financial decisions are often extensions of their state's policy goals.10 5
C. Escalating Chinese Investment in the Western World
The outbound flow of Chinese capital, both by private and stateowned enterprises, dates back to 2002, beginning with investments in
developing economies and shifting to Western economies in 2005,"'
with Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's personal computer business and
CNOOC's bid on Unocal. 1°7 Since then, Chinese investment abroad has
ballooned, with experts predicting growth of fifty percent per year in the
coming years. 10 8 The values of these transactions have increased over
time, with a number of multibillion-dollar acquisitions occurring across
2015 and 2016.09
Chinese acquisitions of American corporations have occurred in
thirty-seven of fifty states and are well diversified across a broad range
of sectors." 0 China has ventured into the energy industry with the SOE
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company's acquisition of Devon
Energy Corporation's shale oil and gas fields, a $2.5 billion acquisition
and into American cinemas with Dalian Wanda Group Company's
acquisition of AMC Entertainment Holdings, a $2.6 billion
acquisition."' Additional energy sector investments include a series of
oil and gas asset acquisitions by CNOOC, China Petrochemical
Corporation, and Sinochem totaling over $8.6 billion." 2 In the food

104. Id. at 106.
105. See id at 105-06.
106. See Riley, supra note 15.
107. See Lemon, supra note 11 (discussing Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's personal computer
division for 1.25 billion USD); White, supranote 20 (discussing CNOOC's 18.5 billion USD bid on
Unocal and its subsequent withdrawal).
108. China's Foreign Acquisition Surge in 2016, ASIA TiMEs (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.atimes.com/article/chinas-foreign-acquisitions-surge-in-2016.
109. See James & Morse, supra note 14, at 7. The table indicates several multibillion-dollar
acquisitions of and joint ventures regarding Western corporations in 2015 and 2016, including the
forty-three billion USD Syngenta deal. Id.
110. See Daniel H. Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, The Rise in Chinese Overseas Investment and
What it Means for American Business, CHINA Bus. REv. (July 1, 2012), http://www.chinabusiness
review.com/the-rise-in-chinese-overseas-investment-and-what-it-means-for-amerian-businesses.
111. See id.
112. Chinese Acquisitions of US. Companies, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/interactive
economy/chinese-acquisitions-us-companies (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
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sector, Shuanghui International made a $4.7 billion acquisition of
Smithfield Foods. 13
As the values of the transactions have increased, so has the nature
of the players. 114 Chinese SOEs are joined by the CIC, a sovereign
wealth fund, in their overseas ventures.1 5 Together, SOEs and the CIC
create a massive flow of capital into the United States. 6 While those
investments primarily take the form of majority share acquisitions of
U.S. companies, 1 7 investors can exercise control over a corporation
without purchasing a majority of a company's voting securities. 18
D. ShareholderActivism, Controllinga Company
Without a ControllingPercentageof Shares
In 1950, institutional investors in the United States held no more
than eight percent of stock.119 By 1989, that number had grown to fortyfive percent. 2 ° It has been estimated that in 2015, the number of
shareholders filing individual income taxes on dividends had declined to
less than twenty-five percent of all shareholders in the U.S. equities
market.12 1 As institutional investing increased, a phenomenon that came
to be known as shareholder activism developed, the goal of which is the
improvement of corporate governance and the maximization of
shareholder value.122 As it happens, activist shareholder campaigns are
often successful in achieving this goal. 123
113. Joel Backaler, What the Shuanghui-Smithfield Acquisition Means for Chinese Overseas
Investments, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2013, 7:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelbackaler/

2013/11/05/what-the-shuanghui-smitheld-acquisition-means-for-chinese-overseas-investment/
#c48da59604e3.
114.
115.
116.

See James & Morse, supra note 14, at 7.
See Wee, supra note 22.
See supranotes 79-87 and accompanying text.

117. See Rosen & Hanemann, supranote 110.
118. See infra Part ll.D.
119. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and(Uncertain)Significance of InstitutionalShareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445,447 (1991).

120. Id.
121. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S.
Corporate Stock (May 16, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/
publication-pdfs/2000790-The-Dwindling-Taxable-Share-of-U.S.-Corporate-Stock.pdf
Interestingly, foreign entities, whether they be private individuals or public entities, account for
approximately twenty-five percent of equity ownership in the United States, equal to that of total
individual ownership in equities. Id
122. See Yaron Nili, Missing the Forestfor the Trees: A New Approach to Shareholder
Activism, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 157, 162-63, 165 (2014).

123. See Joseph Cyriac, Ruth de Backer & Justin Sanders, Preparingfor Bigger, Bolder
Shareholder Activists, McKINSEY

& CO.

(Mar. 2014),

https://www.mckinsey.com/business-

functions/strategy-and-corporate-fnance/our-insights/preparing-for-bigger-bolder-shareholderactivists.
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In an analysis of four hundred activist campaigns conducted over
the course of the last decade, business management consulting firm
McKinsey & Company found that the median activist campaign
"reverses a downward trajectory in target-company performance and
generates excess shareholder returns that persist for at least thirty-six
months." 124 The success of these campaigns has begotten further
shareholder activism; between 2011 and 2014, activists launched over
240 campaigns, more than double the number of campaigns launched
over the same time frame a decade earlier. 125 Furthermore, activists have
become more ambitious, targeting larger and larger companies over
time. 126 At the end of the last decade, the average market capitalization
of a target company was two billion dollars, 127 a number which had
grown to ten billion dollars by the end of 2013.128
PricewaterhouseCoopers identified a number of tactics shareholder
activists use to achieve their goals.12 9 One of the common tactics, and a
relatively passive approach, is the "Say-on-Pay" vote and related
investor activities.13 ° A Say-on-Pay vote is a proxy item that asks
shareholders to vote on the compensation schemes of the company's top
executives, specifically the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial
Officer, and up to three other named executive officers. 13 1 Companies
are required to present shareholders with an opportunity to participate in
a Say-on-Pay vote every one, two, or three years. 132 When Say-on-Pay
votes appear on proxies, activists will use the opportunity to leverage
their significant share of voting securities, using letters to the company,
meetings, and phone calls to affect a substantive change to the
33
compensation plan.1
Activists' use of shareholder proposals is more aggressive than
their Say-on-Pay related activities.' 34 The use of a shareholder proposal,
or often just the threat of a proposal, is made with one of several changes
as the goal.1 35 These goals are most often changes to the board's
governance policies or composition, changes to the executive
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Cloyd, supra note 27.
See id.

131.

Investor Bulletin: Say-on-Pay and Golden ParachuteVotes, SEC OFF. INVESTOR EDUC. &

ADVOCACY, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/sayonpay.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
132. Id.
133. See Cloyd, supra note 27.
134.
135.

See id.
See id.
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compensation plan (similar to the goal of Say-on-Pay activities), changes
to the company's oversight of certain functions such as audit or risk
management, and changes to the company's activities as corporate
citizens (such as political spending). 36 Shareholder proposals, especially
with respect to the last goal, are often used by religious organizations
and investor coalitions with broad societal and policy aims or as a
supplemental strategy by hedge funds.' 37

The "vote no" campaign aims to withhold shareholder votes from a
particular director or directors in an effort to exert pressure. 138 These
campaigns are rarely successful-ninety-three percent of directors enjoy
ninety percent support from shareholder voters-as most companies
require support from a majority of total outstanding votes rather than
those present at a given shareholder meeting. 39 However, challenged
directors can buckle under pressure and withdraw or be made vulnerable
to future campaigns after receiving weak support. "I
The final and most aggressive activist method identified by
PricewaterhouseCoopers is hedge fund activism. 14' The term "hedge
fund activism," though not exclusively the domain of hedge funds, refers
to extensive campaigns aimed at making a significant change to a
corporation's strategy. 142 This strategy dates back to the 1980s, during

which so-called "corporate raiders" would seek the breakup of
companies. 143 In the modem era, hedge funds will purchase large
minority stakes in the target company and will use minority board
representation to influence corporate strategy.'" In 2017, Nelson Peltz,
through his activist fund Trian Fund Management, attempted to leverage
its $3.5 billion stake in Procter & Gamble to secure a board position in a
hotly-contested proxy contest. 145 Though Mr. Peltz ultimately secured
the board position, it seemed as though Trian might suffer the first major

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., Michelle Celarier, Procter& Gamble's Win is Rare in a Year ofActivist Gains,

INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/bl53zzrf8jqhrl/
procter-amp-gambles-win-is-rare-in-a-year-of-activist-gains.
145. Id.
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activist loss of 2017.146 This sort of hedge fund activism, however, is
47
generally extremely effective. 1
While Nelson Peltz and Trian Fund Management campaigned to
place Peltz on the board of Procter & Gamble, Trian managed to
successfully place one of its partners, Ed Garden, on the board of
General Electric, where Trian has a $2.5 billion stake.'4 8 Paul Hilal and
his activist fund, Mantle Ridge, succeeded in acquiring five seats on the
board of CSX Corp. and successfully lobbied for the replacement of the
chairman. 149 The list goes on, with Arconic, Buffalo Wild Wings, and
Hain Celestial Group each ceding board positions in the face of
aggressive campaigns spearheaded by activist hedge funds. 5 ° In fact, the
forfeiture of board seats in the face of activist aggression is the norm. 5 1
A study by J.P. Morgan found that activists won at least a single board
seat in forty-six percent of launched campaigns, up from forty-one
percent in 2016.52 Of fifty-four contests in the study, only nineteenjust over a third-actually went to a proxy vote.' 53
Settlement and productive engagement with activist hedge funds
has become increasingly common. 5 4 Sullivan & Cromwell's 2016
assessment of trends in shareholder activism has shown that the number
of proxy contests initiated fell sharply in that year, suggesting an
increased willingness of companies to work with activists to resolve
disputes.'5 5 There has likely been no lack of interest in securing
controlling positions on the boards of these companies. 56 In the four
years Sullivan & Cromwell examined, nearly three-quarters of proxy
contests sought a control slate or a slate for a majority of the board's
seats. 57 In fifty percent of the proxy contests surveyed, the activist
managed to obtain one or more seats on the board.' 5 8
146. Id. Mr. Peltz attained the position on the board "just a bit more than a year after he
launched what ultimately became the largest boardroom battle in the history of director fights."
Ronald Orol, Nelson Peltz Begins Showdown Over P&G CEO, R&D, THESTREET (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/14507431/1/nelson-peltz-begins-showdown-over-p-g-ceo-r-d.html.
147. See Celarier, supra note 144 (discussing various wins by activist investors in 2017).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.

151. See id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154.

2016 U.S. Shareholder Activism Review and Analysis 17-18, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL

LLP (Nov. 28, 2016), https://sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication
holder Activism Review and Analysis.pdf
155. See id. at 18.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 19.
158. Id.
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When an activist launches a proxy contest with a slate that would
grant them majority control if won, companies engage in settlement
almost sixty percent of the time.159 If put to a vote, the potential loss of
majority control over the company is far riskier than short slate contests,
which result in settlement some thirty percent of the time.' 60 The net
result is that companies are very vulnerable to activist shareholders with
a stake large enough to threaten a bid for majority control over the
company and as a result, are willing to reach painful compromises.16 ' By
leveraging less than nine percent of Hertz Global Holdings's outstanding
corporate stock, Carl Icahn was able to force a settlement, striking a deal
with the management to replace three board members and naming a new
62
permanent CEO. 1
E. The Benefits of Chinese Investment in the United States
Foreign direct investment ("FDI") is an important source of
economic growth for any country, and the United States is no
different. 163 FDI was the primary contributor to some twelve percent of
the United States' total productivity growth in the twenty-year period
between 1987 and 2 0 0 7 ." In 2016, economists from the International
Trade Association's Office of Trade and Economic Analysis estimated
that some twelve million jobs-8.5% of the United States' labor forcewere attributed to FDI, with half of those individuals directly employed
by U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned companies. 165 In 2013, foreign
companies spent some fifty-three billion dollars on research and
development in the United166States and exported some $360 billion from
the U.S. to other countries.
To illustrate, while L'Ordal is a household name in the United
States-the author of this Note has a bottle of the company's volumizing
shampoo on a shelf in his shower-the company is headquartered in
France. 167 However, L'Or6al directly employs more than ten thousand
people in the United States, exports over $500 million in L'Or6al
159.

See id

160. See id.
161.

See, e.g., Hertz and Carl Icahn Execute Definitive Agreement, HERTZ (Sept. 16, 2014),

http://ir.hertz.com/2014-09-16-Hertz-And-Carl-Icahn-Execute-Definitive-Agreement.
162.

See id.

163.
164.

See Moran, supra note 35.
Id.

165.

Felicia Pullam, New Study: How Important is FDI to the U.S. Economy?, TRADEOLOGY

(Feb. 24, 2016),
economy.
166. Id.
167. Id.

https://blog.trade.gov/2016/02/24/new-study-how-important-is-fdi-to-the-u-s-
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products from the U.S. and sources a great deal of its production-related
purchases from contractors and sub-contractors within the country.168
Similarly, the massive German airliner Lufthansa employs over 14,000
people across the United States and forms a cornerstone of the airline
industry in the country.'69
FDI affects a vast number of economic sectors in the United
States."' Of particular interest is the fact that FDI creates jobs for some
44.6% of automotive industry employees, 36% of chemical products
employees, 32.4% of ground transportation service employees, and
These figures,
31.6% of petroleum and coal mining employees.'
particularly those related to the automotive and petroleum and coal
mining sectors, are important to keep in mind because these are
vulnerable industries in the United States, suffering significant hits to
production and employment figures and facing weak outlooks
in 2018.172

Clearly, FDI is historically a major driver of the United States'
economy.' China is the next major source of FDI, and while some are
concerned about the implications for the United States' national security,
others are optimistic about the economic boons the country could
realize.17 4 Chinese-owned firms employ more than 140,000 people
nationwide, up nine times since 2009, and that number is poised to
grow." 5 Of particular note are Chinese "greenfield" investments, the
construction of factories and building of businesses from the ground up
in America. 176 While the number of these investments is small at present,
they are expected to increase substantially, along with Chinese FDI into
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. JULIAN RJCHARDS & ELIZABETH SCHAEFER, JOBS ATTRIBUTABLE TO FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2016).

171. Id. The raw numbers in these listed industries are 369,000, 286,000, 149,000, and 35,000,
respectively. Id. Further, there are nineteen industries in which FDI is directly or indirectly
responsible for the creation of more than ten percent of the jobs in the sector. Id. at 6. By raw
number of jobs created, FDI creates over 600,000 jobs in the retail sector, nearly 500,000 in
administrative and support services and wholesale trade, and 400,000 in the restaurant industry. Id.
172. See Steven Mufson, Coal in the Trump Age: Industry has a Pulse, but Prospectsfor Jobs
Are Weak, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2017, at GI; Bill Vlasic, Carmakers Cut American Jobs at Sales
Slump, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2017, at Al.

173. See Moran, supra note 35.
174. See Alana Semuels, Will China Save the American Economy?, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/china-american-factories/531507.
175. See id Increasing wages, electricity costs, and industrial land prices are giving Chinese
businesses strong incentives to look abroad in the coming years when making determinations about
where to locate their factories. Id. Contradictory to popular understanding about global economics,
Cao Dewang, head of Fuyao Glass, built a factory in Dayton, Ohio because "apart from labor costs,
everything else is cheaper in the U.S. than in China." Id.
176. Id.
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the United States more generally. 177 This wave of investment comes at a
critical time for an American economy that is seeing new-business
178
creation hitting forty-year lows.
F. A Brief Primeron CFIUS, Exon-Florio,andFINSA
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, created
by executive order in 1975, reviews potential investments in the United
States in consideration of their national security implications. 179 In 1988,
Section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,180
the "Exon-Florio provision," gave the President the power to suspend
any merger, acquisition, or takeover by a foreign entity that he deems a
threat to national security.' 8 ' Importantly, the exercise of this power was
established as not subject to judicial review. 8 2 The 1993 Byrd
Amendment further developed the scope and responsibilities of the
President and CFIUS by requiring these investigations any time an
investment could affect national security and mandating full reports to
83
Congress with respect to the decision-making process. 1
In 2007, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act, the most recent legislation dedicated to defining
the role that national-security concerns play in the regulation
of foreign investment in the United States. 18 4 FINSA was
passed in the wake of the Dubai Ports World debacle' 8 5
and served to codify the CFIUS review process in the most
comprehensive treatment of this area of executive power thus far.186

177.

Id.

178. Id.
179. Stephen K. Pudner, Moving Forwardfrom Dubai Ports World-The Foreign Investment
andNational Security Act of2007, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1277, 1278 (2008).

180. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-4118 § 5021 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2170 (2012)).
181. Pudner, supra note 179, at 1280. Ronald Reagan would delegate the powers granted to the
Presidency by the Exon-Florio provision to CFIUS through the use of an executive order soon after
the passage of the Act. Id. at 1281.
182. Id. at 1280-81.
183. Id. at 1281-82.
184. Christopher M. Weimer, Foreign Direct Investment and National Security Post-FINSA
2007, 87 TEx. L. REv. 663, 663 (2009).
185. Pudner, supra note 179, at 1282.
186. See Christopher S. Kulander, Intruder Alert! Running the Regulatory Gauntlet to
Purchase, Own, and Operate American Energy and Mineral Assets by Foreign Entities, 46 TEx.
TECH. L. REv. 995, 1021 (2014). The Dubai Ports World debacle involved the purchase of
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company by Dubai Ports World, a company owned by
the United Arab Emirates, which gave the UAE control over six large United States seaports.
CFIUS cleared the acquisition, much to the outrage of the general public. Id.
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of the parameters under which CFIUS
The result was an expansion
18 7
transactions.
could review
CFIUS reviews a transaction once two threshold requirements are
met.' The first is that the transaction gives "an alien entity control over
..189 The second is that the acquisition
a United States firm. .".
implicates "interests that could be characterized as important for national
defense .... .""g What constitutes gaining "control" over a firm is largely
in the hands of CFIUS; there is no specific threshold of security
ownership in a company that would trigger an investigation.' 9' ExonFlorio defines control "as the power to direct key matters
affecting... the power to sell off the corporation's assets, dissolve the
firm, close its facilities, and terminate its contracts."' 92
With respect to what constitutes "national security," Congress has
provided a number of factors through the Exon-Florio provision and
FINSA. 193 These initial factors outlined in the Exon-Florio provision are:
(1) the domestic production needed for projected national-defense
requirements;
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet nationaldefense requirements, including the availability of human resources,
products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services;
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by
foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the U.S. to
meet the requirements of national security;
(4) the potential effects of the transaction on the sales of military
goods, equipment or technology to a country that supports terrorism or
proliferates missile technology or chemical and biological weapons;
and
technological
(5) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S.
94
leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security. 1
With the passage of FINSA-after the Dubai Ports World
controversy-Congress expanded the criteria assessed by CFIUS to
include a further six items:
[1] the potential national-security related effects on United States
critical infrastructure, including major energy assets;

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Seeid. at 1010.
Id. at 1008.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1009-10.
Id.
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[2] the potential national-security related effects on U.S. critical
technologies;
[3] whether the covered transaction is a foreign government-controlled
transaction;
[4] the subject country's adherence to nonproliferation control regimes
and its relationship with the United States, specifically its record on
cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts (as appropriate);
[5] the long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of energy
and other critical resources and material; and
[6] other factors the President or the Committee may determine to be
195
appropriate.

The aggregated criteria CFRUS may use to define what constitutes
an acquisition of a firm relevant to national security is considerably
more robust than in the past. 19 6 This is firmly intentional. 97 The
guidance Congress provided between the Exon-Florio provision and
FINSA is not exhaustive, as the aim is to allow CFTUS to assess
transactions without being confined to certain industries.' 98
There are certain types of transactions that are ineligible for CFJUS
review. 199 Specifically, FINSA states that transactions "made solely for
the purpose of investment" are not to be subject to the scrutiny of
CFTUS.2 °° This language is very similar to that of the HSR Act's
201
Investment-Only Exemption.
G. The Hart-Scott-RodinoAct and the Investment-Only Exemption
The HSR Act is a set of amendments to U.S. antitrust law,
primarily the Clayton Antitrust Act.20 2 A fairly straightforward statute,
the HSR Act's provisions require that parties to major transactions file
premerger notifications with the FTC and the DOJ. 2°3 The parties then
abide by a waiting period, during which the FTC and DOJ conduct an
investigation into the nature of the merger.2°

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 1010.
Id.
Id. at 1009.
Id
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (2012).

202. Id. § 12; see Matthew S. Bailey, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: Needing a Second Opinion
About Second Requests, 67 OHIo L.J. 433,439-40 (2006).

203.
204.

15 U.S.C. § 18a(a), (d)(1).
See id. § 18a(b).
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Generally speaking, the HSR Act requires premerger filings when
20 5
the parties to the transaction are involved in some form of commerce
2 °6
and when the size of the transaction exceeds $200 million.
Alternatively, even if the size of the transaction does not exceed $200
million, premerger notification is still required if the transaction is in
excess of $50 million and one party has more than $10 million in sales
or assets, and the other party has more than $100 million in sales
or assets.20 7
The premerger notification filing and the subsequent waiting period
are burdensome to the parties.2 8 The FTC and DOJ have the ability to
9
delay acquisitions and mergers by months 2 and cause millions in direct
expenses to the parties involved. The average cost of compliance with a
second request is approximated at some five million dollars, with
expenses of twenty million dollars and upwards common on complex
transactions.2 10 Obviously, there is significant incentive for companies
interested in executing large acquisitions of voting securities to avoid
these regulatory hurdles, and, fortunately, there are a number of
built into the HSR Act to help companies effectively execute
exemptions 211
such trades.
The Investment-Only Exemption provides that if an acquisition of
voting securities is "solely for the purpose of investment," and the share
of securities acquired or held does not exceed ten percent of the issuer's
outstanding voting securities, the transaction is exempted from the
regulatory requirements of the HSR Act.212
III. ALL-OR-NOTHING: THE PROBLEMATIC
TREATMENT OF CHINESE CAPITAL

Currently, eighty-four percent of investments into the United States
2 13
from China come in the form of acquisitions of domestic companies.
Acquisition proposals are often accompanied by considerable
consternation and are reviewed by CFIUS.214 Very recently, CFIUS has
205.

See Bailey, supra note 202, at 440-41.

206.

See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a).

207. See id.
208. See Bailey, supra note 202, at 454-55 (noting that the Second Request process can delay
the processing of a merger by as much as six months on a relatively simple transaction and in excess
of a year for more complex deals).

209.

Id.

210.

See id.

211. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9)).
212. Id,
213.
214.

Moran, supra note 35.
See id In 2016, when ChemChina proposed to acquire Syngenta as detailed above, an
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become more prone to blocking transactions involving Chinese-backing,
citing national security concerns.215 By the end of the first half of 2017,
CFIUS had sent at least nine letters advising potential Chinese investors
that their deals would be blocked. 16 This regulatory scheme has led to
an all-or-nothing dynamic where deals are either made and entire U.S.
companies are sold, or the U.S. government reaches into the affairs of
private entities and precludes massive potential injections of capital into
217
the U.S. economy.
In this Part, Subpart A discusses the issues at hand with CFJUS,
primarily the lack of reviewability of executive determinations regarding
FDI transactions and the broad nature of CFIUS's reviews,2 18
while Subpart B discusses the underutilization of the passive
investment exemptions written into FINSA and the HSR Act by
Chinese investors.2 19
A. The Problem with CFIUS
CFTUS and the associated Exon-Florio Amendment, as empowered
by FINSA, represent the primary means by which the U.S. government
has sought to foreclose the possibility of foreign direct investments from
22°
affecting national security.
CFIUS recently settled the first lawsuit in its history. 2 In 2015,
CFIUS and President Barack Obama sought to force Ralls Corporation,

Iowan Senator, Charles Grassley, demanded a CFIUS review of the transaction on the grounds that
it would threaten the "food security" of the United States. Id The Obama administration obliged,
but CFIUS failed to find any national security threat. Id.
215. Greg Roumeliotis & Diane Bartz, US. Toughens Stance on Foreign Deals in Blow to
China's Buying Spree, REUTERS (July 20, 2017, 7:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usachina-companies/exclusive-u-s-toughens-stance-on-foreign-deals-in-blow-to-chinas-buying-spreeidUSKBN1A532M.
216. Id. In the first half of 2017, a record eighty-seven deals between Chinese and American
companies had been proposed, and the nine letters sent by CFIUS represent government
intervention in more than ten percent of deals between the two countries. Id.
217. See, e.g., Ana Swanson, Trump Blocks the Sale of a U.S. Chip-Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 2017, at B1; Ed Leefeldt, U.S. Businesses, Now Owned by China, CBS NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017,
5:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-u-s-m-a-its-a-one-way-street
(demonstrating
examples of United States companies being purchased in their entirety by Chinese investors or
where such transactions were blocked by the U.S. government); Greg Roumeliotis, U.S. Blocks
MoneyGram Sale to China's Ant Financialon NationalSecurity Concerns, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2018,
4:36
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moneygram-intl-m-a-ant-financialu-s-blocksmoneygram-sale-to-chinas-ant-financial-on-national-security-concerns-idUSKBN 1ERI R7.
218. See infra Part HI.A.
219. See infra Part II.B.
220. See supra Part IF.
221. See Judy Wang, Rails Corp. v. CFIUS: A New Look at Foreign Direct Investments to the
United States, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 30, 31 (2016).
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a Delaware-based corporation owned by two Chinese nationals, to divest
itself of four wind farm acquisitions that it deemed threatening to
national security.22 2 The ultimate settlement was a victory for foreign
direct investors in the United States. 223 The implication for the greater
international investment sphere is that CFIUS orders made after the
fact-in this case, that the wind farms be divested after their
acquisition-are reviewable in court under due process claims (i.e.,
deprivation of property). 224 This issue of reviewability seems to
incentivize companies to forgo CFIUS review and submit notice after
the transaction is complete, but it is clear that this is not the case, as
international investors continue to file with CFIUS in advance of
transactions. 2 5 However, the question of reviewability is an interesting
one-the presidential determination that a transaction is a national
security risk, and the subsequent blocking of that transaction, is not
reviewable in court.226 However, that determination is reviewable after
will form the groundwork
the fact of the transaction. 227 This dichotomy
228
imbalance.
this
to
solution
for a prospective
This problem is exacerbated by the broad nature of CFIUS's grant
of power.229 Under FINSA, CFIUS has the power to review and block
transactions under a broad array of circumstances. 230 The catchall terms
of FINSA-"other factors the President or the Committee may
determine to be appropriate"-gives the committee and the executive
wide latitude in determining where executive interference may exist in
private transactions.2 31 While this may seem appropriate, the preceding
eleven factors outlined between the Exon-Florio Amendments and
FINSA provide a broad array of circumstances to begin with; the grant
of power over "other factors" as deemed appropriate extends CFIUS's
reach beyond the already existing comprehensive outline of situations in

222. See id. at 37-40.
223. See id. at 46-49.
224. Id. at 47-49.
225. Id.
226. Ivan A. Schlager et al., Court Finds CFIUS Violated Rails Corporation's Due
Process

Rights,

SKADDEN,

ARPS,

SLATE,

MEAGHER,

&

FLOM

LLP

(July

17,

https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2014/07/court-finds-cfius-violated-ralls2014),
corporations-due.
227. See Wang, supra note 221, at 46-47. Rather than informing CFIUS of its intended
transaction and exposing itself to the possibility of being blocked without recourse in the courts, a
company can complete the transaction and gain at least some minimal due process rights. Id
228. See infra Part IV.
229. See supra Part I.F.
230. See supra Part .F.
231. See supra Part H.F; see also 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (f)(11) (2012).
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which national security is threatened.232 Without clear boundaries,
CFIUS's actions are largely unpredictable.23 3 Indeed, Chinese
telecommunications company Huawei Technologies
Company
("Huawei") has had a difficult time investing in the United States for
years, failing to secure CFIUS approval in no less than three acquisitions
in the late 2000s. 234 In fact, one proposed Huawei acquisition of two
million dollars in assets, equipment, and staff from a small firm in Santa
Clara, California-a blip on the radar for a panel which routinely
reviews multibillion dollar acquisitions-was threatened by a CFIUS
review. 21 This is curiously out of line with the guidelines that CFIUS
should review transactions implicating control over a company
and highlights the uncertainty and arguably arbitrary nature of
236
CFIUS review.
B. "Solelyfor the Purposeof Investment," Underutilized
FINSA, like the HSR Act, has a provision pertaining to investments
made "solely for the purpose of investment.- 23 7 These two regulations
work in tandem with each other to create a safe harbor for investors
searching for a passive minority stake, but they are not particularly wellutilized by Chinese investors. 238 The reason is because the return on
investment for U.S. securities is low, and Chinese investors are flush
with cash and looking to make large bets to maximize their return on
investment. 239 The HSR Act only permits purchases of up to ten percent
of a company's outstanding voting securities before the transaction is
subject to review regardless of the passive intent of the buyer.24 ° While
this is substantial at a cursory glance, the amount of wealth that these
investors are channeling is comparatively massive, and there are clearly
insubstantial regulatory incentives to entice Chinese investors from
channeling their FDI capital into passive minority stakes rather than full
acquisitions. 24' The regulatory scheme presented is underutilized and

232. See supra Part II.F.
233. See Reginald Cuyler, Leaving Home the Bacon: JudiciallyReviewing CFIUS'Approvalof
Shuanghui Acquiring Smithfield Foods, 6 U. PUERTO RICO Bus. L.J. 206, 221 (2015).
234. Id. at 220-2 1.
235. Id. at 221.
236. Id.
237. Kulander, supra note 186, at 1009.
238. Moran, supra note 35 (indicating that eighty-four percent of Chinese FDI takes the form
of acquisitions of American companies).
239. See Semuels, supra note 174.
240. See supra Part HG.
241. See Moran, supra note 35.
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to match the realities of
could stand to be significantly overhauled
242
FDI.
of
sphere
supply and demand in the
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC POLICY:
A REGULATORY SOLUTION

The solution to the issues presented is a cohesive set of
amendments to existing legislation aimed at preserving the national
security aims of CFIUS, while making them more precise so as to
prevent CFRUS reviews from overly inhibiting the flow of FDI into the
United States.24 3 The first of these amendments is to create a private
right of action for corporations whose transactions are blocked pursuant
to FINSA and an executive determination based on a CFJUS
recommendation. 2 ' The second of these amendments is a redrafting of
the eleven criteria outlined by FINSA and the Exon-Florio Amendment,
providing the guidelines as to what kind of transactions are subject to
CFIUS review, making them more precise to ensure that corporations
can enter into agreements they may reasonably anticipate will not be
blocked by the executive branch.2 45 Finally, the third of these
amendments is a surgical alteration of the HSR Act's Investment-Only
Exemption, doubling the threshold at which passive investments must be
reviewed by the SEC and DOJ so as to create a regulatory scheme that
incentivizes non-controlling minority stake purchases as a valuable
alternative for potential FDI. 24
A. Implementing JudicialReview in FINSA
In 2015, as stated, CFTUS settled its first-in-history lawsuit with
Ralls Corporation, the Delaware company it had ordered to divest itself
of four limited liability companies it had purchased in the energy
sector.24 7 Prior to the settlement, the District Court of the District of
Columbia determined that this claim was reviewable within the judicial
branch under the due process claim at hand, which is definitively at odds
with those executive determinations made prior to the completion of
transactions.2 48 While the difference between an executive order barring
a transaction from occurring and an executive order demanding the
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra Part HLB.
See supra Part I.B, E.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See Wang, supra note 221, at 31.
See supra Part M.A.
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divestment of the limited liability companies in Rails is significant, it
stands to reason that unilateral executive determinations that bar
corporations from realizing economic gains should be reviewable in a
court of law to weigh the legitimacy of the government's interest in
blocking a particular transaction.24 9
For example, in 2015 CFIUS refused to grant permission for a
transaction to take place between Philips, a Dutch company and Chinese
investor GO Capital, which would have sold eighty percent of its
Lumileds division to the Chinese company for a price of $3.3 billion.2
On the surface, this is a simple transaction involving the sale of a
commercial lighting affiliate, but a closer look explains CFIUS's
concerns-namely, that Philips was conducting experiments with
gallium nitride, a substance that serves as a critical component in
advanced radar and anti-ballistic missile systems.251 CFIUS's concerns
are often well-founded and reasonable, but the process of judicial review
would refine the process and eliminate the accusations of unilateralism
and (hopefully) overturn executive bars against transactions that are
252
unreasonable or arbitrary.
As such, this Note's first recommended solution to the legal issue at
hand is the drafting and legislation of an amendment to FINSA granting
a private right of action for corporations whose transactions with foreign
companies are blocked by executive determination pursuant to the
statute due to national security concerns.253
B. Redrafling the Criteriafor CFIUS Review for Clarity and Precision
Currently, CFIUS will review a transaction when a foreign entity
gains "control" over an American firm and when that acquisition
implicates national security concerns.254 What, precisely, constitutes
"control" and "national security" is often difficult for prospective
companies to decipher in anticipation of a proposed acquisition.25 5 This
has led to difficulty in executing transactions and broad and
249.
250.

See Wang, supra note 221, at 50.
Moran, supranote 35.

251.

Id.

252. See e.g., id. In 2015, CFIUS blocked a Chinese company's attempt to purchase a
Canadian mining company with rare earth properties on the grounds that China controls ninety
percent of rare earth exports and has historically been known to withhold the export of rare earths to
Japan during territorial disputes. Id. CFIUS's order for Rails Corporation to divest itself of the LLCs
controlling the wind farms was due to the fact that the wind farms overlooked a military training
facility's airspace where the Navy tests its latest generation of drones. Id.

253. See infra Part IV.B.
254. See supra Part H.F.
255. See supra Part H.F.
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unpredictable results when it comes to CFIUS reviews. 25 6 Rather than
any official block coming to pass, companies that face CFIUS reviews
often abandon the transaction entirely rather than bearing the cost of
doing business that is unlikely to prove fruitful.2 57 In light of these
issues of clarity, it is imperative that Congress take action to
make CFIUS review more predictable, transparent, and-at some
level-more lenient. 8
The two terms at issue are "control" and "national security. 259 The
second part of this solution is a series of amendments to FINSA and
Exon-Florio that would resolve this issue of clarity by detailing more
carefully the currently nebulous and expansive circumstances under
which CFTUS review is triggered. 26 ° First, "control" should be more
specifically worded to define what level of minority stake in a
corporation would be considered a controlling stake. 26 1 To create
synergy with the amendment to the HSR Act, this Note recommends a
threshold of twenty-percent ownership of voting securities in a
corporation.2 62 Second, the criteria under which CFJUS shall review
transactions due to national security concerns is overly broad and should
be amended with specificity. 263 Specifically, this Note recommends that
Congress draft and pass legislation amending the FINSA and ExonFlorio criteria to address specific industries that Congress believes are
particularly vulnerable to foreign intrusion with respect to foreign
investment, contrasted with the vague and broad criteria currently in
place. 2' That said, this amendment should retain the eleventh clause
within the criteria, granting the executive and CFIS the power to

256. See supra Part Il.A (discussing Huawei's repeated attempts at entering into transactional
deals with American companies).
257. See Daniel N. Anziska, The CFIUSProcess is Becoming More Challengingfor Foreign
Investors, TROUTMAN SANDERS (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.troutman.com/the-cfius-process-is-

becoming-more-challenging-for-foreign-investors- 10-10-2017 (listing a number of transactions that
were blocked by CFIUS or abandoned in the face of potential CFRIUS intervention). The list of
transactions Anziska discusses would have represented ten billion dollars of FDI across 2016 and
2017. Id.
258. See supra Part I.E (discussing the benefits of FDI in the United States).
259. See supra Parts HF, HI.B.
260. See supra Parts II.F,
III.B.
261. See supra Parts IF, III.B.
262. See infra Part IV.C. This Note recommends that the HSR Act increase the threshold of the
Investment-Only Exemption provision of the HSR Act to twenty percent of outstanding voting
securities.
263. See supra Part IB.
264. See supra Part H.F.
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review transactions that it deems a threat to the national interest.265
Coupled with judicial review of CFIUS decisions as outlined above,
such extensions of CFJUS review and executive determinations will be
subject to scrutiny in order to ensure that they are reasonable in light of
the transaction and the national security interest at hand.266 Now, the
final part of this solution-amending the threshold of the InvestmentOnly Exemption-combines this improved CFIUS process with a way to
incentivize non-controlling, passive investments.267
C. Expansion of the Investment-Only Exemption
At present, transactions that would acquire ten percent or less of a
corporation's outstanding voting securities are exempted from the
reporting requirements of the HSR Act. 268 By expanding that number to
fifteen or twenty percent, investors would be able to make significantly
larger investments in domestic firms. 269 The provisions of the HSR Act
nullify the threat of shareholder activist tactics, but the expanded
threshold permits substantial capital injections into the United States's
industry sectors.27 °
This use of the Investment-Only Exemption as a safe harbor
necessarily relies on the effective enforcement of the provision, as
without proper policing of investors' conduct CFIUS would have
grounds to review the transaction under a theory of control.271 As it
happens, in recent years the FTC and DOJ have provided more clarity on
the boundaries of the Investment-Only Exemption and have undertaken
enforcement proceedings against violators.2 72 As demonstrated by the
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See
See
See
See
See

supra Part H.F.
supra Part IV.A.
infra Part V.C.
supra Part H1.G.
Anziska, supra note 257. Unisplendor attempted to purchase a $3.8 billion equity

stake in Western Digital, a minority, non-controlling stake in the company, but CFJUS determined
that this fifteen-percent stake was sufficient to determine that the company would gain control over

Western Digital. Id.
270. See supra Part II.D-E.
271. See supra Part II.F.
272. See Jennifer T. Wisinski, HSR Update: IncreasingRisk in Relying on Passive Investment
Exemption, HAYNES & BOONE, LLP (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.haynesboone.com/alerts/hsr-

(describing
enforcement
update-increasing-risk-in-relying-on-passive-investment-exemption
proceedings taken against "certain ValueAct entities" for failing to comply with the passive
investment exemption of the HSR Act); see also Debbie Feinstein, Ken Libby, & Jennifer Lee.,
"Investment-only" Means Just That, FTC (Aug. 24, 2015, 5:25 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-

events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/08/investment-only-means-just. The FTC has provided a
non-exhaustive list of activities violative of the passive investment exemption that cover a broad
range of common business activities, all of which it considers to fall within the purview of the

"formulation, detennination, or direction of the basic business decisions" of the corporation. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 18

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:293

ValueAct and Third Point cases, 27 3 the DOJ and the FTC are willing and
able to enjoin transactions violative of the Investment-Only
Exemption. 7 4 The ValueAct enforcement in particular showcases how
aggressive and punishing the trend in enforcement has become, as the
DOJ levied the largest-ever fine of eleven million dollars against
ValueAct Capital Management LP for utilizing hedge fund activist
tactics after investing under the auspices of the Investment-Only
Exemption and enjoined it from further abusing its stake in the
company.2 75 Demonstratively, the United States and CFIUS can expect
foreign investors' use of the Investment-Only Exemption to be wellpoliced by the regulatory infrastructure currently in place.27 6
V. CONCLUSION

Addressing the inflow of Chinese capital into Western economiesespecially the United States-is a challenge.277 Capital brought to the
United States through FDI has long been a powerful aid in the
development of the country's economy, contributing to the employment
of millions of Americans and increasing American exports by hundreds
of billions of dollars.27 8 Chinese investment in the United States is no
different, being immensely valuable to the country's economy.279
Chinese FDI directly employs some 140,000 individuals and indirectly
employs many more. 28' Further, the injection of Chinese capital comes
at a time when the United States is economically vulnerable, and the
infusion of capital will help bolster American industries in sectors such
281
as automotive, energy production, and mining for years to come.
That said, there are significant concerns that the political nature of
companies
and
sovereign
wealth
funds
Chinese-owned
2
82
Concerns about
pose a threat to American national security.
acquisition of sensitive defense-oriented technology, patents, and

273. See Feinstein et al., supra note 272; Nigro, supra note 49; Wisinski, supra note 272.
274. See Feinstein et al., supra note 272.
275.

See David Benoit, ValueAct to Pay Record $11 Million to Settle Justice DebartmentSuit,

WALL STREET J. (July 12, 2016, 4:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/valueact-to-pay-record-1 1million-to-settle-antitrust-lawsuit-1468346589.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See, e.g., id.
See supra Parts II, III.
See supra Part H.E.
See supra Part ll.E.
See supra Part H.E.
See supra Part H.E.
See supra Part I.B.
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monopolization of strategic resources has led the United States to
place more Chinese-backed FDI transactions under CFIUS
review than at any other time in the board's history.283 While
the intentions are good, this has resulted in a net decline of newly
announced mergers and acquisitions between American and Chinese
companies in 2017.284
Cross-border investment is valuable, and even if the fears of anticompetitive policies and national security risks are well-founded, it
would be grossly imprudent to discourage Chinese investment
altogether.2 85 In fact, it is critically important that the United States
abandon its all-or-nothing approach to Chinese investment in the United
States, and works diligently to create legislation that promotes precision
in CFIUS-recommended bars against specific transactions, clarity and
transparency with respect to the conditions under which CFIUS review
is to be required and alternative minority-stake investment by Chineseowned companies.28 6
By drafting an amendment to FINSA that grants a private right of
action to corporations whose transactions with foreign companies are
blocked by CFIUS -recommended executive action, the United States can
subject the process to the watchful eyes of the judicial branch to ensure
that such actions are truly in the interest of national security.287 By
refining FINSA's and the Exon-Florio Amendment's criteria for
blocking a transaction and clearly delineating which sectors and
industries are to be the subject of such scrutiny, the United States can
provide clarity such that companies interested in investing in the United
States may reasonably anticipate what mitigation efforts they must take
in making their deals palatable to the panel.288 Finally, by increasing the
threshold of the Investment-Only Exemption to exempt transactions
made "solely for the purpose of investment" to twenty percent, the
United States can take a meaningful step toward incentivizing minoritystake FDIs in U.S. companies. 289 Taken together, these changes will
meaningfully preserve the security of the nation with respect to foreign

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
See supra Part 11.
See supra Part H.
See supra Parts III-IV.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
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investors with political ties while permitting the flow of trade to
continue largely uninhibited.29 °
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